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Abstract
The Preˆt a` Voter schemes allow voters to confirm that their vote
is accurately counted whilst maintaining ballot secrecy. An earlier
version of Preˆt a` Voter uses exponential ElGamal encryption enabling
the use of re-encryption mixes in place of the decryption mixes. To
render decryption tractable whilst avoiding the possibility of extreme
values compromising ballot privacy, it was necessary to draw the seed
values from a suitable statistical distribution, e.g., a binomial. In this
paper we present a similar construction of the ballot forms but using
Paillier encryption in place of ElGamal. The homomorphic properties
of Paillier make it ideally suited to our construction and removes the
need to constrain the distribution of seed values.
As with the ElGamal version of the scheme, we have a distributed
construction of encrypted ballot forms, though here we give an alterna-
tive construction that allows us to set an arbitrary collusion threshold
for the leaking ballot information. This enables on-demand decryption
and printing of the ballot forms and so eliminates the need to trust
a single authority to keep this information secret and avoids chain of
custody issues and chain voting style attacks. A number of further
innovations are introduced, for example, providing the booth device
with a share of the decryption key and transforming the receipt onions
into a form directly decryptable in the booth, thus avoiding the need
to have the tellers available during the voting period.
This is a revised and extended version of TR 965.
1 Introduction
From the dawn of democracy, people have been attempting to devise tech-
nologies to make voting more reliable and remove the need to trust officials.
∗Newcastle University
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All technologies to date have been shown to be vulnerable to corruption, see
[11] for an excellent account of the history of such technologies in the US.
Starting with the seminal paper by Chaum, [6], crytographers have been
devising schemes that use mathematics to guarantee accuracy of the count
and ballot secrecy. In particular, such schemes strive to make the guarantees
independent of the correctness of the software and hardware and so provide
end-to-end verifiability.
Preˆt a` Voter is a particularly voter-friendly example of such a scheme.
It provides the voters with the means to assure themselves that their vote
is accurately counted whilst maintaining ballot secrecy. They have no need
to trust anyone or anything, aside from the validity of certain mathemat-
ical arguments. Preˆt a` Voter has a particularly simple voter interface and
representation of the vote in a protected ballot.
Preˆt a` Voter enables voter-verifiability: at the time of casting their vote,
voters are provided with an encrypted receipt which enables them to check,
via a secure Web Bulletin Board (WBB), that their receipt is accurately
included in a verifiable, anonymising tabulation process. Various checking
mechanisms serve to detect corruption in any phase of this process: encryp-
tion of the vote (more precisely, in the case of Preˆt a` Voter, in the construc-
tion of the ballot forms), recording and transmission of the encrypted ballot
receipt and the decryption and tabulation of the votes. Full details can be
found in [8]. Henceforth we will refer to this version of the scheme as Preˆt
a` Voter’05.
Preˆt a` Voter’05 [8] uses RSA encryption and a layered construction for
the ballot form onions and decryption mixes at the tabulation stage. In [24]
this was adapted to use exponential ElGamal in place of RSA, so enabling
the use of re-encryption mixes in place of decryption mixes. This has several
advantages, for example, clean separation of mix and decryption phases, eas-
ier recovery in the event of faulty mix tellers or corruption detection during
the audit phase. Mix tellers do not need to hold secret keys, so a faulty
or corrupt teller is easily replaced. The use of randomising encryption and
re-encryption means that mixes and mix audits can be completely indepen-
dently re-run in the event of significant corruption being detected. For that
matter, mixes and audits could be re-run or run in parallel routinely.
However, adapting Preˆt a` Voter to re-encryption mixes is not entirely
trivial: the special representation of the receipts as a pair of an index value
and an encrypted term, means that they cannot be put directly through a re-
encryption mix, unless we are prepared to leave the index values unchanged
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through the mix. Invariant index values would of course allow an observer
to partition the mix. For Preˆt a` Voter’05, the use of RSA and decryption
mixes means that there is a natural way to transform the index values or
ranking vectors as a function of the germ values revealed at each stage of
the mixes as layers of the onion encryption are stripped off.
The resolution of this problem suggested in [24] is to use exponential El-
Gamal to allow the index value to be absorbed into the onion term. The re-
ceipts can be transformed into pure ElGamal terms that can be put through
a conventional (robust) re-encryption mix. The drawback of this approach
is that the raw votes appear in the final decryption as exponents and so if
unconstrained seed values are used, we would have to solve the discrete log
problem in order to extract the votes. This was avoided by constraining
the seed values to a suitable statistical distribution, i.e., a binomial. This
renders the decryption tractable whilst avoiding edge-effects that might com-
promise secrecy in some instances if the seed values where simply bound to
an interval.
In this paper we explore the use of Paillier encryption in place of El-
Gamal. This has the advantage that the homomorphic structure of Paillier
is ideally suited to our purposes and we are able to sidestep the obstruc-
tion described above and so relax the constraints on the choice of the seed
values. We also provide an alternative distributed construction of the en-
crypted ballot forms that avoids the paired onions of [24] and, furthermore,
allows us to set an arbitrary collusion threshold to determine the receipt
onion/candidate order associations.
We note that in a recent paper [3], Adida and Rivest propose a “Scratch
and Vote” scheme that uses Preˆt a` Voter ballot forms with Paillier encryp-
tion, but for a different purpose: to allow homomorphic tabulation.
2 Election System Requirements
There is no universal consensus as to voting system requirements and in any
case, they will vary from application to application and according to juris-
diction. Here we describe informally the commonly accepted requirements
of the vote capture and counting components of the system.
The primary goal of a voting system is accuracy or integrity : all legiti-
mately cast votes should be accurately included in the count. Furthermore,
accuracy should be demonstrable. Thus we will strive for verifiability, i.e:
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we provide mechanisms that demonstrate that the count is accurate. Often,
cryptographic schemes provide unconditional integrity, that is, they provide
guarantees of integrity that do not depend on computational assumptions.
In other words, integrity is guaranteed even against adversaries with un-
bounded computational power.
We will also require that a voter’s choice will be kept secret, often termed
ballot secrecy or ballot privacy. This is to avoid threats of vote buying or
coercion.
A related property is that of receipt freeness: there should be no way
for the voter to construct a proof to a third party as to how they voted.
In other words, even if the voter is prepared to cooperate fully with the
coercer, the coercer cannot be certain of the vote. A still stronger property
is that of coercion resistance: even if the coercer is able to play an active
part in the vote casting protocol, possibly influencing how any choices in an
adaptive fashion, he still cannot determine how the voter actually cast their
vote. The distinction between these two notions only really comes into play
in the context of remote voting, where the coercer can observe and influence
certain steps of the protocol. For supervised voting, as addressed in this
paper, the distinction is not relevant. We remark also that the term receipt
freeness is a little misleading: most voter-verifiable schemes seek to provide
receipt freeness but provide a form of protected receipt.
A rather novel requirement, not feasible in conventional systems, is that
of voter-verifiability. Voters are able to confirm that their vote is accurately
included in the count and, if not, to prove this to a judge. At the same
time, the voter is not able to prove to a third party which way they actually
voted.
Besides the above technical requirements, voting systems must also be
cost-efficient, easy for voters to use and sufficiently simple to gain a sufficient
degree of public understanding and trust. Discussion of these requirements
is outside the scope of this paper, but we remark that the Preˆt a` Voter
approach strives to be as conceptually simple as possible.
3 Related Work
There is a large and rapidly growing literature on cryptographic voting
schemes. It is not appropriate to attempt to cover it all here. We will
just mention the most closely related literature, concentrating on schemes
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designed for the supervised rather than remote context. A more complete
survey can be found in [4], and for anonymity mechanisms, mixes etc see
the anonymity bibliography, [2].
The first suggestion that cryptographic techniques could be applied to
voting systems appears to be Chaum’s 1981 paper on anonymising mixes,
[6]. Benaloh and Tunistra, [5], introduce the notion of coercion-resistance
along with a scheme using homomorphic tabulation that satisfies it. Later,
Chaum [7] and Neff [17] introduced schemes that could be regarded as more
practical than previous schemes. The original Preˆt a` Voter scheme, [20] and
[21] was inspired by the Chaum scheme, replacing the visual cryptography by
the candidate permutation concept. Chaum has subsequently adopted the
Preˆt a` Voter candidate permutation concept in his new PunchScan scheme,
[1]. Recently, Rivest has proposed ThreeBallot, [18] that provides voter-
verifiability without using cryptography.
4 Outline of Preˆt a` Voter
We recall the key ingredients of the Preˆt a` Voter scheme. The key innovation
of the Preˆt a` Voter approach is, to encode the vote in a randomised frame
of reference, i.e., a randomised candidate list. As a consequence, the voter’s
choice does not need to be encrypted and so, in contrast to other crypto-
graphic schemes, there is no need for the voter’s choice to be communicated
to an encryption device. Thus, the device does not learn the voter’s selec-
tion and so the threat of this information being leaked via side channels
and subliminal channels is neatly sidestepped. Another useful spin-off of
the Preˆt a` Voter ballots is that the randomisation of the candidates serves
to eliminate any bias that may occur with a fixed ordering. The Electoral
Reform Society in the UK has recommended varying the candidate order
precisely to achieve fairness.
Suppose that our voter is called Anne. At the polling station, Anne
pre-registers and is assigned (or chooses) at random a ballot form sealed in
an envelope, an example of such a form is shown in Figure 4.
In the booth, Anne extracts her ballot form from the envelop and makes
her selection in the usual way by placing a cross in the right hand column
against the candidate of choice, or, in the case of a Single Transferable Vote
(STV) system for example, she marks her ranking against the candidates.
Once her selection has been made, she separates the left and right hand
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Obelix
Idefix
Asterix
Panoramix
7rJ94K
Figure 1: Preˆt a` Voter ballot form
X
7rJ94K
Figure 2: Preˆt a` Voter ballot receipt
strips along a thoughtfully provided perforation and discards the left hand
strip. She is left with the right hand strip which now constitutes her privacy
protected receipt, as shown in Figure 2.
Anne now exits the booth clutching her receipt, registers with an official
and casts her protected receipt in the presence of the official. Her receipt is
placed over an optical reader or similar device that records the random value
at the bottom of the strip and an index value indicating the cell into which
the X was marked. A digitally signed copy of the receipt is also created at
this point and passed to Anne as her receipt. The original paper receipt is
cast in a ballot box.
The fact that Anne gets a photocopy of her receipt rather than the
original is useful in that makes the use of decoy LH strips (showing alterative
candidate orders) to counter coercion threats, [23] particularly effective. If
Anne retains the original, it may be possible to tell that perforation marks
on the decoy do not match up with the receipt.
The randomisation of the candidate list on each ballot form ensures that
the receipt does not reveal the way the vote was cast, so ensuring the secrecy
of the vote.
The value printed on the bottom of the receipt, the “onion”, is the
key to extraction of the vote. Buried cryptographically in this value is the
information needed to reconstruct the candidate order and so interpret the
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vote value encoded on the receipt. This information is encrypted using a
threshold scheme with secret keys shared by a number of tellers. Thus, only
a threshold set of the tellers acting in concert are able to reconstruct the
candidate order and so interpret the vote value encoded on the receipt.
Each form has a unique, secret seed value ρ drawn from some seed space
S. The candidate permutation is computed from the seed using a publicly
agreed function σ from S to ΠC , the set of permutations on the candidate
set C. Each ballot form can be thought of as a tuple:
(pi, {ρ}PKT )
where PKT is the threshold public key of the tellers and pi is the can-
didate permutation. The ballot is well-formed iff pi = σ(ρ). The value ρ is
kept secret. A receipt has the form:
(ι, {ρ}PKT )
Where ι is the index value indicating the cell in which the voter placed
their X or a vector carrying rankings, approvals etc depending on the elec-
tion system.
With preprinted forms, it is possible to audit a randomly selected pro-
portion of the forms, using for example the Adida/Rivest off-line auditing
mechanism, [3]. Audit information, zero-knowledge proofs of the correct
decryption of the onions, is printed on the ballot forms but concealed with
a scratch strip. To audit a form, the strip is removed, revealing the audit
information and invalidating the form for voting. Such auditing can be per-
formed before and during the election period. The voters may be invited to
choose random forms for audit. For on-demand ballot forms we will need
alternative mechanisms that will be discussed later.
5 Anonymising Tabulation
Once the election has closed, the digitized copies of the receipts are trans-
mitted to a central tabulation server which posts them to a secure WBB.
This is an append-only, publicly visible facility. Only the tabulation server,
and later the tellers, can write to this and, once written, anything posted
to it will remain unchanged. Voters can visit this WBB and confirm that
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their receipt appears correctly. If their receipt does not appear, or appears
incorrectly (i.e., with the X in the wrong position) they can appeal to des-
ignated authorities. Note that, since they hold physical receipts, they have
sound grounds for complaint if their receipts fails to appear on the WBB.
After a suitable period, assuming that any objections to the posted re-
ceipts have been suitably resolved, the mix tellers take over and perform
an anonymising mix on the batch of posted receipts. The first mix teller
takes the batch of ballot terms, re-encrypts each term and posts the result-
ing terms in a secretly shuffled order in the next column. The next mix
teller takes the output of the first and performs a second mix and posts the
resulting re-encrypted, shuffled terms to the next column of the WBB. We
perform as many such mixes as required.
After a suitable number of re-encryption mixes, the decryption tellers,
who hold shares of the secret key corresponding to the public key under
which the seeds were encrypted, take over and extract the votes. Again, all
intermediate steps are posted to the WBB to allow subsequent auditing. No
further shuffling is required at this stage.
Various auditing mechanisms serve to detect and deter any corruption
in the construction of the ballot forms and in the operation of the tellers
during the anonymising and tabulation phases. We do not detail these here
as we will be introducing somewhat modified mechanisms tailored to this
version of the scheme later in the paper.
6 Paillier encryption
Paillier encryption is a randomising algorithm that is ideally suited to Preˆt a`
Voter with re-encryption mixes. Key generation proceeds as follows: firstly
generate an RSA integer n = p · q and compute the Carmichael function
of n: λ := lcm(p − 1, q − 1). Find a generator g of Z∗n2 such that g = 1
(mod n). The values (n, g) are published as the public key whilst λ forms
the secret key.
The encryption of a message m ∈ Zn is computed as:
c = gm · rn (mod n2)
Where r is a freshly generated random value drawn from Zn.
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Decryption is given by:
m =
L(cλ (mod n2))
L(gλ (mod n2))
(mod n)
Where we have defined L(x) := (x− 1)/n. Due to the way that the pay-
load is carried in the exponent, Paillier enjoys the homomorphic property:
{a; r}PK × {b; s}PK = {a+ b; r × s}PK
7 On-demand Generation of Preˆt a` Voter Ballot
Forms
In this section we present a mechanism to generate the forms ab initio,
including the seed entropy, in the booth. In the next section we will describe
a distributed construction of encrypted ballot forms. We assume that the
public key of the tellers, PKT = (g, n), is suitably certified and publicised
and that there is a publicly agreed function, σ, from the seed space in to
the set of permutations of the candidates. Each booth device creates two
public key pairs PKb1, SKb1 and PKb2, SKb2.
Anne is now given a form at random that carries only a unique, random
serial number ξ. When she enters the booth, she feeds this form into a
device that reads the serial number. It applies its first secret, signing key
SKb1 to ξ to generate the seed value ρ from which it computes the candidate
order pi. It also computes the onion value θ by encrypting the seed value, ρ,
with the public, threshold teller key PKT . The randomisation used in this
encryption is generated by signing ξ with its second secret key SKb2.
It prints the candidates on the LH column of the form in the appropriate
order. On the RH strip it prints the onion value to give a conventional Preˆt
a` Voter form. To facilitate auditing should the form be selected for audit,
we can use a variant of the Adida/Rivest off-line audit mechanism, [3]: the
device prints information to enable checking the well-formedness of the ballot
later. We will discuss this in more detail later, for the moment we denote
the audit information by µ. For a form used for voting, this information will
be discarded along with the candidate order, but it will be preserved on a
form destined for audit.
Thus, the seed is computed as:
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ξFigure 3: Proto-ballot form with serial number
Idefix
Asterix
Obelix
Panoramix
µ ξ
Θ
Figure 4: Preˆt a` Voter ballot form showing the onion and audit information
ρ := {ξ}SKb1 (mod n)
the randomisation factor as:
ζ := {ξ}SKb2 (mod n)
the candidate order as:
pi := σ(ρ)
and finally the onion value:
θ := {ρ, ζ}PKT
The figures illustrate this: Figure 3 shows a typical proto-ballot form
bearing only a serial number. Figure 4 shows the form after the booth
device has computed and printed the the candidates and aduit information
µ on the LH side, and the onion value at the bottom of the RH side.
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The generation of the seed and randomisation as deterministic signatures
on the serial number serves to counter kleptographic attacks in which the
device leaks information over subliminal channels by careful selection of the
seed value, [16]. The proposed mechanism ensures that the device has no
freedom in the choice of the seeds.
Later we will discuss cut-and-choose mechanisms to partition ballot
forms into ones for audit and ones for casting votes.
8 Distributed generation of Paillier encrypted bal-
lot forms
The disadvantage of the approach above is that the booth device necessarily
learns the association of the candidate order and onion value. We could
implement these devices in such a way as to ensure that all information is
erased once the form is printed. However, guaranteeing this may be difficult
and, furthermore, there will be dangers of the information being leaked
over side-channels. The more elaborate construction of this section seeks to
address these issues.
The ballot forms will be generated by a set of l clerks in such a way
that each contributes to the entropy of the cryptographic values from which
the candidate list is derived. Furthermore, these values remain encrypted
throughout. As a result, all the clerks would have to collude to determine
the seeds values.
As before, we assume a set of decryption tellers who hold the key shares
for a threshold Paillier algorithm with Teller public key PKT : (g, n). These
will act much as the tellers of the original scheme and will be responsible for
the final decryption stage after the anonymising re-encryption mix phase.
This public key is known to the Clerks and is used in the construction of
the encrypted ballot forms.
The first clerk C0 generates a batch of initial seeds s¯0i drawn at random
from Z∗n. From these, C0 generates a batch of initial onions by encrypting
each s¯0i under the Teller key:
E(s¯0i , x0i ) = (gs¯
0
i · (x0i )n) (mod n2)
for fresh random values x¯0i drawn from Z
∗
n.
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The remaining l− 1 Clerks now perform re-encryption mixes and trans-
formations on this batch of onions: each Clerk takes the batch of onions
output by the previous Clerk and performs a combined re-encryption along
with an injection of fresh seed entropy into the seed values. For each onion,
the seed entropy is drawn from Z∗n is injected into the seed value of the onion.
The seed entropy and randomising factors will be independently chosen for
each onion.
More precisely, for ith onion of the j − 1th batch Θj−1i := E(sj−1i , x¯j−1i ),
the jth Clerk Cj generates fresh, random values x¯
j
i and s¯
j
i ∈ Z∗n and multi-
plies Θj−1i by E(s¯ji , x¯ji ):
Θji = E(sji , xji ) = E(sj−1i , x¯j−1i ) · E(x¯ji , x¯ji ) = E(sj−1i + s¯ji , x¯ji × xj−1i )
where
xji = x
j−1
i × x¯ji (mod n2)
sji = s
j−1
i + s¯
j
i (mod n)
Having transformed each onion in this way, the Clerk Cj then performs
a secret shuffle on the batch and outputs the result to the next Clerk, Cj+1.
So the final output after l − 1 mixes is a batch of onions of the form:
Θi := E(si, xi) = (αsi · (xi)n) where:
xi = xli and si = s
l
i
si =
l∑
j=0
s¯ji (mod n), xi =
l∏
j=0
x¯ji (mod n
2)
As the seed values, and hence the candidate orders, remain encrypted,
none of clerks knows the final seed values and they would all have to collude
to determine them. These onions can now be stored and distributed in
this form, thus avoiding the chain of custody problems mentioned above.
Kleptographic channels are also avoided as no single entity is able to choose
the seed values in such a way as to leak information.
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8.1 Transforming Receipt Onions into Booth Onions
We could now proceed to use these onions, which we will refer to as the
receipt onions, directly in the construction of the ballot forms, much as
described in the previous section. However, we would like to ensure that
the booth device does not learn the value of the onion used in the receipt
in order to avoid it knowing the association of receipt onion and candidate
order. If we are prepared to assume that the device can be implemented
and maintained to ensure erasure and non-leakage of such information then
this would be fine.
If we prefer not to have to make such assumptions, we propose two fur-
ther stages in the construction: firstly to generate re-encryptions of these
onions and secondly to perform partial decryptions of to onions to create
onions that are decryptable unaided by the booth device. It may be that
the additional complexity involved in these extra stages is regarded as out-
weighing the benefits of avoiding the information erasure properties. This
trade-off depends on threat evaluations etc.
We introduce a number of re-encryption clerks and we assume that the
onions created in the previous phase described above have been printed on
proto-ballot forms. That is, each ballot form will have printed on it a unique
onion drawn from the set generated as described above. The first of these re-
encryption clerks will take the batch of such forms and for each will perform
a re-encryption of the onion on the form. It will then cover the onion with
a scratch strip and overprint this with the re-encrypted onion value. The
resulting batch of forms, now showing only the re-encrypted onion values,
is shuffled and passed on to the next re-encryption clerk who repeats the
process. At each stage the output batch of onions is posted to the WBB
for auditing. This can be repeated for as many re-encryption clerks as we
require, depending on how high we want the collusion threshold to be placed.
Just one such clerk might be judged sufficient in some cases.
The upshot of all this is that we have a batch of forms on which are visible
only the final (multiply) re-encrypted onion values overprinted on a (multi-
layer) scratch strip. Under these scratch strips are the receipt onions. The
voting procedure is now as follows: again Anne picks up a form at random
and proceeds to the booth. The scratch strip should be kept intact until the
point at which the ballot is cast. In the booth, the device reads the visible
onion, decrypts it and computes the candidate list. The device prints the
candidate list and audit information on the LH side of the form resulting in a
conventional Preˆt a` Voter ballot form. For the form that she chooses to vote
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with, Anne fills in her selection, removes and discards the LH column and
leaves the booth. In the presence of an official, the scratch strip is removed
to reveal the receipt onion (and in the process destroying the booth onion).
Vote casting completes as before.
Note that the use of the scratch strips to conceal the receipt onions also
helps counter chain voting and chain of custody attacks. This construction
ensures that only a collusion of the booth device and all the re-encryption
clerks can determine the candidate order/receipt onion associations.
8.2 Partial Decryption of the Receipt Onions
An issue that we need to address with the above construction, is how the
booth device is to perform the decryption of the onion. A possibility is to
have (some of) the tellers available online and have the booth device commu-
nicate the onion value to them to perform partial decryption of onions. We
could arrange for the booth device to hold a share of the key and so perform
the final step of the decryption. This is workable, but has the drawback of
requiring tellers to be online during the election and raises issues of ensuring
that the partial decryption service offered by the tellers cannot be abused.
A more satisfactory approach is to transform the receipt onions to a form
that can be decrypted unaided by the booth device.
To this end, we assume that the teller secret key is shared using a (t,m)
threshold scheme and we introduce a further transformation phase in which
a t − 1 subset of the tellers perform partial decryptions with their share
of the teller key, but stopping short of full decryption; the final step of
the decryption will be performed at the last moment by the booth device.
Here we describe how this can be accomplished for ElGamal ciphertexts. A
similar, but rather more elaborate construction can be provided for Paillier
terms, but we omit the details due to space constraints. Note that no shuffles
are required in this phase.
We assume a Shamir secret sharing scheme with threshold t such that
the secret key for the receipt onions K is given by K = f(0), where f is
a randomly chosen polynomial of degree t − 1 and ki = f(i) is the share
allocated to the i’th teller. For a set of tellers, with index set S of size t,
the secret is given by:
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K=f(0)=
∑
i∈S µSi · f(i) =
∑
i∈S µSi · ki
where the µ terms are the appropriate Legendre coefficients for the set
S.
For this stage of the ballot construction, we assume a fixed threshold
set S comprising t − 1 tellers and the booth, whose share we index as t.
We progressively decrypt an ElGamal ciphertext (x0; y0) by progressively
factoring out the (xo)µ
S
i ·ki terms from the second y0 term of the ElGamal
ciphertext pair. For i ∈ {1, ...t − 1}, the i’the teller performs the following
partial decryption on the i− 1’th ElGamal term:
Di(x0; yi−1) = (x0, yi) = (x0; yi−1 · (x0)−µi·ki)
We stop short of performing the final, t’th decryption step with the key
share held by the booth so obtaining the booth onion. The final step of the
decryption can be applied at the last moment by the booth device when the
voter presents the ballot form in the booth:
ρ = Dt(x0; yl−1) = yt−1 · (x0)−µt·kt
9 Auditing the Clerks
We audit the behaviour of the clerks by posting the outputs of all the in-
termediate steps of the ballot creation process to a WBB. Again we can
use partial random checking (PRC) to verify that each clerk is performing
its task faithfully. The ballot generation process can be seen as (roughly)
mirroring the tabulation phase. This is rather natural as they are essentially
dual processes.
Details of how PRC works with Preˆt a` Voter can be found in [8]. For
audited links during the first phase, we could require the clerk to reveal
the fresh seed factor s′ and re-randomisation factor r′. Both of these could
be required to be generated as signatures on the input term in order to
eliminate any possibility of kleptographic style attacks. For an audited link,
suppose that the input term is θ and the claimed output θ′. The auditor
could then check:
θ′ = θ · gs′ · (r′)n (mod n2)
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and
s′ = {θ}SK1 ; r′ = {θ}SK2
For the second, pure re-encryption phase, auditing can be performed in
much the same way but without the fresh seed factor. For the third, partial
decryption phase, we can perform a full audit on all links as we are not
performing any further mixing at this stage. Here we would use the Zero
Knowledge proof protocol of [9] to ensure that all the partial decryptions
are performed correctly.
Later we will introduce mechanisms to check that final ballot forms are
correctly constructed in the booth. However, it is important to catch any
corruption or malfunction in the generation phase as soon as possible and be
able to remove any rogue clerks before the election starts. This also means
that any errors detected in the on-demand ballots can be firmly pinned on
the booth device.
10 Auditing “On-demand” Ballot Forms
The mechanisms described above allow for the distributed generation of
ballot forms, just-in-time decryption of the candidate list and printing of the
ballot forms in the booth. This has clear advantages in terms of removing
the need to trust a single entity to keep the ballot form information secret
and avoids chain of custody issues. On the other hand, it means that we
can no longer use pre-auditing of pre-printed ballot forms. Given that we
want to avoid having to trust the device in the booth, we must introduce
alternative techniques to detect and deter any corruption or malfunction in
the creation of the ballot forms. For this we introduce a cut-and-choose
element into the protocol.
To this end, voters could be furnished with two or perhaps more en-
crypted ballot forms. For each of these, the booth device decrypts the
onion, computes the candidate order and prints this on the form. The voter
selects one at random to cast her vote: the others will be audited and dis-
carded. Care must be taken to avoid introducing dangers of double voting
or chain voting etc. Double voting is probably fairly easily countered by the
supervised casting of ballot receipts in the presence of officials who ensure
that only one form is cast and the voter’s name is marked as having voted.
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Chain voting threats might be a little more delicate to counter: here a
malicious voter, Yves, secretes a decrypted ballot form and smuggles it out
of the polling station. Yves marks this form with the candidate of his choice
and passes it to another voter who is required to cast their vote using this
form. Yves can subsequently check whether the voter complied by checking
the WBB. Keeping a log of serial numbers issued to a voter, in the manner
of known counters to chain voting [14], would help here. If we employ
the scratch strip technique of section 8, this has the effect of concealing the
receipt onion value and so thwarting chain voting attacks. The receipt onion
would only be revealed at the time of casting the ballot and verified in the
presence of officials.
An alternative approach is the double sided forms of [22] to provide
a mechanism to keep a clear account of the distribution of ballot forms.
Here, each side of a form carries an independent onion pair. On each side,
the onion is decrypted and the candidate order printed. This results in two
independent ballot forms being generated, one on each side of the form. The
voter selects one side to vote and the other for audit. The forms actually
have a third, blank column opposing the candidate list on the other side.
Thus, detaching the candidate list on the voted side simultaneously detaches
the blank column of the flip side, so leaving an intact form for audit.
11 Checking the Well-formedness of On-demand
Ballot Forms
To check the correct construction of a form selected for audit, the auditor
will apply the first booth public key, PKb1, to the seed value and check that
the result agrees with the serial number and that applying the second booth
public key to the randomisation factor also gives the serial number. It then
recomputes the candidate order and checks that this matches that printed
on the form. Finally it recomputes the onion value using the randomisation
provided and checks this matches the value on the form (or verifies the
correctness of the ZK proof of the encryption).
To facilitate auditing of selected forms, we can use a variant of the
Adida/Rivest off-line auditing mechanism, [3]. A niave approach is to have
the booth device print audit information on the LH strip of the ballots.
Thus the device would print the seed value and a ZK proof that this value
is the true plaintext for the ballot. Damg˚ard et al, [9], provide ZK protocol
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to prove correct decryption of a Paillier ciphertext that assumes the prover
knows the randomisation.
For most randomising algorithms, for example ElGamal, a decrypting
device that simply decrypts a given ciphertext will not have access to the
randomisation. for Paillier, Damg˚ard et al show that knowledge of the secret
key allows recovery of the randomisation. This rather remarkable fact about
Paillier encryption seems to be surprisingly little known. For completeness
we give the details below. The Damg˚ard et al paper actually gives the
results for their generalisation of Paillier to modulo ns+1, but for simplicity
of presentation we give the result for Paillier’s original modulo n2 version of
the algorithm.
Suppose that the decryption teller P is given a ciphertext c = gm · rn
(mod n2). He recovers the plaintext m from which he can compute g−m
(mod n2). From this P can extract randomisation term: rn = c · g−m
(mod n2). Now P needs to take the n’th root of this term. He computes a
value a such that a · λ+ 1 = 0 (mod n) and then computes:
(rn)
a·λ+1
n (mod n) = ra·λ+1 (mod n) = r (mod n)
Where a threshold scheme is used, the device performing the (final) step
of the decryption will not know λ. We observe however that to extract the
randomisation factor from the n’th residue term does not require knowledge
of λ but only of the value η := (a·λ+1)/n. Furthermore, knowledge of η does
not entail knowledge of λ. As a result we may safely allow the decrypting
devices to know η to enable them to extract the randomisation factor.
For a threshold scheme set up by a dealer who distributed the shares
to the tellers, the dealer will know λ and so can compute η. However, we
may prefer to avoid having a dealer know λ and so would use a distributed
scheme to set up the shares in such a way as no single entity knows λ. In
this case it is not so clear how η can be computed. This will be investigated
in a forthcoming paper.
The fact that the audit information is printed on the LH side of the form
means that for a voted form, this information will be discarded along with
the candidate order. There may be a concern that a coerced voter might try
to record the audit information in order to prove his vote to a coercer, or
simply retain the LH strip. Having a plentiful supply of alternative LH strips
in the booths counters this but it is essential that there be no information
of the LH strip to link it to its partnered RH strip. For the original Preˆt
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a` Voter forms the LH strip carries only the candidate order and so there
is no linkage. Now this decoy strip mechanism is less effective as the audit
information links the true LH strip to the receipt.
Mechanical or procedural techniques to enforce the destruction of the
LH strip can be envisaged, but these all introduce the need for trust as-
sumptions. An alternative is to introduce an extra step in the protocol:
first the device commits to the candidate order on all the forms presented
to it, then the voter chooses one to vote with, at which point the device
prints the audit information only to the remaining audit forms and not on
the voting form. The latter approach provides a strong counter but at the
cost of slightly complicating the voter experience, and possibly introducing
social engineering style vulnerability, [15].
A more robust approach is as follows: the booth device prints only the
seed information on the LH strip. The value of η is revealed only to of-
ficial audit devices that are available at the time of casting. These can
extract the randomisation for forms selected for audit and so check their
well-formedness. For any given form, the booth and receipt onions should
have the same seed value but different randomisations. These audit devices
would also print the randomisation on audit forms so that these could be
independently checked.
Without knowledge of the randomisation it should be impossible for
anyone to verify the seed value against the onion value, hence impossible
to prove a link between the LH an RH portions of a ballot form. A fur-
ther safeguard would be to require the booth device to print the seed value
encrypted under the public key of the official audit devices. Thus only the
official audit devices could reveal the seed value and the randomisation.
Auditing the receipts could take place at several points in the process.
A first check could be performed at the time of casting the receipt: official
auditing devices would be available at the registration desk. As we don’t
want to trust the official audit devices we can introduce voter helper or-
ganisations, [?]: representatives of the various parties etc. provide auditing
devices at the polling stations so that further checks could be performed
either just after the voter exits the booth or just after casting their receipt.
These independent audit devices could also check the validity of the digital
signatures applied at the time of casting. If receipts are posted immedi-
ately to the WBB, these helper organisations could also check the accurate
posting of a receipt on behalf of a voter.
Additionally, auditing could take place on material posted to the WBB.
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All the information on both sides of the receipts would be posted. The
voted and auditable sides should be posted to separate regions of the WBB
in such a way as to loose any association between the two sides. The voted
sides would be processed via the tabulation mixes whilst the auditable sides
are available to be verified by anyone. Note that, in principle, anyone can
write an auditing program: the algorithms are all public and indeed quite
standard.
12 Re-encryption Mixes
The receipts do not have the form of pure Paillier terms, rather they are
pairs: an index term or vector and a Paillier encrypted onion. With re-
encryption mixes, there is no natural way to transform the index terms as
they move through the mix. This is in contrast to the case with decryption
mixes: at each stage entropy is revealed as a layer of encryption is peeled off
and this entropy is used to govern the transformation of the index values.
In fact, these transformation can be so arranged as to undo the effect of the
permutations of the candidate order used in the construction of the ballot
form, [8].
For the simple selection of one candidate from the list, we can restrict
ourselves to cyclic shifts of the candidate list rather than full permutations.
For single candidate choice voting, this is sufficient to ensure that the receipts
do not reveal the voter’s selection and allows us to absorb the index value
into the Paillier onion. We will discuss the more general case in Section 14.
Suppose that ν is the number of candidates and ρi is the seed for the ith
ballot, then we can let ρi (mod ν) be the offset of the candidate list. We
can absorb the index value ι on the ballot receipt into the Pailler onion:
{ι, (α−ρ.yn)} → (αι.α−ρ.yn) = (αι−ρ.yn) (mod n2)
Note that, for convenience, we encrypt −ρ rather than ρ. This gives a
pure Paillier encryption of the value ι− ρ which, taken modulo ν, gives the
index for the voter’s original candidate choice in the canonical base ordering.
These pure Paillier terms can now be sent through a conventional, robust
re-encryption mix.
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13 Auditing the Mix Tellers
Next, we need to confirm that the tabulation mix tellers perform all their
actions correctly, i.e., each column is a re-encryption and permutation of
the previous column, without revealing the permutations. Numerous tech-
niques have been proposed to achieve this. For comprehensive descriptions
of various techniques see [4] or [10]. The technique that we describe here, as
it is both rather intuitive and flexible, is that of randomised partial checking
[13]: half of the links are randomly chosen to be revealed and verified. The
choice of links, whilst essentially random, is carefully constrained in such a
way as to ensure, for each transformation there is a 50/50 chance of it being
audited whilst, for each teller, no full link across the two mixes is revealed.
We omit a detailed description as this can be found in [24].
It is possible to verify the correctness of the re-encryption for selected
links without revealing the re-encryption factors by using zero-knowledge
proofs of plaintext equivalence. It is not clear however that revealing the
re-encryption factors for audited links poses any threat, and so it is not clear
that there is any real benefit in incurring the extra cost of constructing such
ZK proofs. Indeed, if we are concerned to confirm that the mix tellers are
playing by the rules and using “genuine” entropy for the re-randomisation
factors, it might be useful to reveal them for the audited links. We might
for example require that the tellers compute the re-randomisation factors
as signatures on the mix terms, that can be verified for audited links. An
alternative approach is to use Neff’s robust anonymising shuffle techniques,
[17], though these would have to be adapted to Paillier encryption rather
than ElGamal.
13.1 Auditing the Decryption tellers
Finally, we also need to confirm that all decryptions are performed correctly
in the final decryption phase of tabulation. Here we can be more direct and
can audit every decryption as we do not need to worry about anonymity at
this stage-anonymity is provided by the mix phase. Thus we need simply
check that each decrypted vote does indeed encrypt to the corresponding
term in the previous column. Given that we are using a randomising al-
gorithm here, the process of checking the correctness of the decryptions is
not quite trivial: we can’t simply perform the encryption of the claimed
plaintext and check the result agrees with the ciphertext, and of course we
don’t want to reveal the secret keys. This problem is addressed in [9] which
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provides ZK protocols to proof the correctness of decryption shares which
can then be combined to yield the full decryption.
14 Handling full permutations and STV style elec-
tions
Handling full permutations of the candidate list is straightforward in the
2005 version of Preˆt a` Voter that uses RSA onions and decryption mixes [8].
In this case the index value or ranking vector is transformed as a function
of the seed values that are revealed at each stage of the mix. These trans-
formations are so arranged as to undo the sequence permutations applied
to the candidate order during the construction of the forms and the overall
effect is to output decrypted indices (or vectors) that give the candidate
codes (or rankings) in the canonical, base ordering, see [8].
In order to deal with full permutations of the candidate list where ran-
domising encryptions and re-encryption mixes are used, it is not immediately
clear how to generalise the approach of Section 7. One solution is simply to
have one onion against each candidate, encrypting the corresponding candi-
date code. For a single candidate selection, the ballot receipt would in effect
simply be the onion value against the chosen candidate. This feels rather
inelegant and inefficient in that it multiplies the number of onions required.
A rather neat way to deal with ranked, STV style, ballots, due to Heather
[12], works as follows. Ballot receipts are formed as vectors of pairs com-
prising a rank value and an onion encrypting the corresponding candidate
index. These receipts are posted as usual and can be checked as before.
Before mixing starts, we introduce an initial normalising step in which each
ballot vector is re-ordered into rank order. Once this is done, the ranking
can be dropped and the ballots are sent through re-encryption mixes as
vectors of onions. Let θi denote the encryption of the i’th candidate index.
Thus, for example, a ballot vector:
{(3,Θ1), (1,Θ2), (4,Θ3), (2,Θ4)}
would be normalised be to:
{(1,Θ2), (2,Θ4), (3,Θ1), (4,Θ3)}
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and then to:
{(Θ2), (Θ4), (Θ1), (Θ3)}
These ballot vectors are now fed into a sequence of re-encryption mixes
in which each onion is independently re-encrypted but the the vector com-
position is preserved. Thus, the vector above would be transformed to:
{(Θ′2), (Θ′4), (Θ′1), (Θ′3)}
Where the prime indicates re-encryption. Once the ballots have gone
through an appropriate number of re-encryption mixes, we move to the
decryption phase. Now we can adopt a lazy decryption strategy: firstly we
just decrypt the top, ranked first, onions for each vector and perform the
first phase of the STV counting. When votes for an eliminated candidate
are transferred, the list of onions in the vector are rotated so that the second
onion goes to the top of the list whilst the previously top vote is encrypted
and drops down to the bottom of the list. Thus, the vector above might be
partially decrypted to:
{Candidate2, (Θ4), (Θ1), (Θ3)}
and, on transfer transformed to:
{(Θ′4), (Θ′1), (Θ′3), (Θ′2)}
We only decrypt lower ranked onions as required by the counting, and
typically we will need only to decrypt a few orders of the ranking before
the counting process terminates. The transfer history of a vote is thus com-
pletely concealed, so countering “Italian” style attacks, in which a coercer
requires a voter to use a certain identifying pattern in his low order rankings
to prove how he voted. Where voters have not filled in all lower rankings,
the remaining onions are simply inserted in the vector in the random order
of the ballot form.
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15 Assurance Arguments
In this section we sketch the arguments to support the claim that the scheme
presented here provides strong guarantees of accuracy of the count along
with ballot privacy (indeed receipt freeness). A more detailed analysis from
a systems perspective can be found in [23]. Full, formal definitions and
proofs are beyond the scope of this paper and will be the topic of future
research.
First we argue that accuracy can only be undermined by either ballot
forms being incorrectly constructed, the set of receipts posted to the WBB
not corresponding to the set of validly cast receipts or the mix and de-
cryption stages not being performed accurately. For each of these we have
described auditing and checking mechanisms to detect any error or corrup-
tion. For the re-encryption mixes for example we have proposed the Partial
Random Checking approach for which it is known that the probability of
the corruption of p ballots going undetected falls off as 1/2p.
For secrecy and coercion-resistance we need to establish: that the re-
ceipts reveal nothing about the vote’s choice and that the anonymising mixes
guarantee that no link can be formed between the input receipts and the
output decrypted vote values. The first follows from the secrecy properties
of Paillier, along with assumptions about the efficacy of mechanisms to en-
sure tht any linkage between the LH and RH portions of the ballot forms is
destroyed. The second assertion follows from the established properties of
re-encryption mixes.
16 Conclusions and Future Work
Preˆt a` Voter provides a voter-friendly, high assurance voting scheme. Strong
guarantees of accuracy and ballot secrecy are based on cryptographic mech-
anisms and optimal transparency. Minimal trust need be placed in software,
hardware, officials etc.
We have described several enhancements of Preˆt a` Voter 2006 to use Pail-
lier encryption in place of exponential ElGamal. This retains the advantages
of Preˆt a` Voter 2006 whilst leading to a more straightforward construction
of the receipts compatible with the re-encryption mixes at the tabulation
stage. The use of Paillier encryption removes the need to constrain the seed
values to a statistical distribution. The seeds can now be drawn freely from
24
the Z∗n. The distrbuted construction is improved compared to the 2006 ver-
sion in that the need for onion pairs is avoided. The new construction also
means that, whereas previously a collusion of last clerk plus booth device
could establish the onion/candidate list associations, now a collusion of all
the re-encryption clerks and booth device would be required.
A number of other improvements have been incorporated, for example,
providing the booth device with a share of the secret teller key. We have
also provided a mechanism for the full generation of the ballot forms in the
booth, including the generation of the seeds. In order to avoid the threat of
kleptographic channels, the seeds and randomisations are generated deter-
ministically as signatures on the ballot serial numbers. This is similar to the
approach originally suggested by Chaum, except that there the signatures
were on sequence number held by the device, [7]. The approach here appears
to be more robust in that it avoids dangers of the device failing to follow a
strict sequence.
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